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This study provides an empirical examination of the theoretical model proposed by Datar, Feltham 
and Hughes (1991) on the demandfor audit quality in an initial public offering (IPO) environment by 
$y utilizing data from Malaysian IPO market. Consistent with the model, two hypotheses are developed; 
(I) there is a positive association between audit qualiry and firm-specific risk, and (2) financial 
reports attested to by higher quality auditors should hcrve a greater marginal effect on current market 
value than the reports associated with low quality auditors. Two models are used to test these 
predictions. The first one is the auditor choice model, which is a multivariate logistic regression 
model, while the second one is the valuation model developed by Datar et al. (1991). 
No evidence is found to support the predicted positive relationship between audit quality andfirm- 
specijic risk However, the results are consistent with the expectation that there is a signiJicant efect 
of audit quality on the market valuation of IPO stocks. This reflects a greater degree o j  conjdence 
placed by investors on reports approved by high quality auditors. The results are also not sensitive to 
alternative definitions of variables, omitted variable problems, the presence of outliers or the size 
effect. Overall, the findings indicate the role of audit quality as a signalling mechanism in the 
valuation of IPO in Malaysia. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurs offering securities when a firm goes public typically posses private information about 
the future prospects of the firm and have high motivation to communicate these information to 
investors in order to avoid the securities from being undervalued. A new issue of securities is 
accompanied by a prospectus that basically contains information about the firm's historical financial 
information, current financial status as well as its future prospects. Specifically, a prospectus includes 
historical profitability, information on the assets, investment plans and economic prospects of the firm 
and in certain countries, the forecasts of profits and dividends as well as information on the risk 
factors. 
Besides these basic valuation parameters, entrepreneurs will adopt other strategies and disclose data to 
signal their private knowledge of the firm. There are a variety of signalling mechanisms available to a 
firm and they can either complement or substitute each other. Among the major signalling 
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mechanisms that have been identified in the accounting literature are the retained ownership or ? 
entrepreneur's shareholding (Leland and Pyle, 1977; and Hughes, 1986), the firm's debt level ( R O ~ ~ ,  
1977), direct disclosure of the firm value (Hughes, 1986), underpricing of the issue (Allen and 
Faulhaber, 1989) as well as auditor reputation (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Beatty, I989 and Menon 
and Williams, 1991). This study attempts to address the role of one of these mechanisms, which is 
audit quality as a signal of the quality of the initial public offering (hereafter referred to as 1PO) and 
its market valuation. 
11. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the role of audit quality in an IPO setting in Malaysia. 
This is done by empirically testing the demand-side prediction of Datar, Feltham and Hughes (1991) 
and the supply-side prediction of Feltham, Hughes and Simunic (1991). In particular, this study 
attempts: 
(1) to examine whether there is an association between audit quality, firm-specific risk and 
retained ownership; and 
(2) to investigate whether there is any marginal effect on current market value of higher 
quality audit. 
This test will provide evidence in relation to the role of audit quality as a signalling mechanism, 
which influences the decisions of both entrepreneurs, who have private knowledge of expected future 
cash flows of their firms, and investors with whom the entrepreneurs seek to trade in order to raise 
capital andfor share risks. 
111. MOTIVATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The inconclusive findings of previous studies are one of the motivations to conduct a study on the role 
of audit quality in the IPO environment in a different market setting. Since most of prior studies have 
been conducted in developed or matured capital markets such as the United States (Feltham et al., 
1991), Canada (Clarkson and Simunic, 1994) and Singapore (Firth and Liau-Tan, 1998), it would be 
interesting to examine audit quality issue in a different economic setting i.e. an emerging capital 
market like Malaysia. This study is also very usehl particularly since several studies have found that 
audit quality does not exist in Malaysia (Simon, Teo and Trompeter, 1992) or that quality- 
differentiated audit services are demanded only by certain segment of audit client, which is the 
multinational or foreign-controlled furns (Eichenseher, 1995 and Rose, 1999). 
More importantly the relatively low level of auditor litigation in Malaysia provides a suitable 
environment to test Datar et al.'s (1991) demand side prediction of audit quality model in which 
entrepreneurs of firms with greater firm-specific risks will choose higher quality auditors. This is 
because the supply side problem, which is the willingness of auditors to supply audit services given 
the high litigation risks (Feltham et al., 1991) will be much less of a confounding factor. This study 
also attempts to extend previous studies by incorporating two new variables in the first model for 
auditor selection, which captures the corporate governance element. Besides, it also utilizes the most 
recent data. 
It is hoped that the findings of this study will provide more insights in understanding the behaviour of 
entrepreneurs, auditors and investors in the new issue setting in Malaysia as well as the role of legal 
environment unique to this country in shaping the demand for and supply of audit quality. 
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IV. IPO PROCESS IN MALAYSIA 
The procedure for initial listing begins when the company submits its application to the Securities 
Commission (hereafter referred to as the SC) through a merchant bank appointed by the company as 
the issue adviser-cum-underwriter. The main function of the issue adviser-cum-underwriter is to 
perform analysis of the issue, to forecast the profitability of the company and to prepare the proposal 
before the submission of the listing application. The SC then conducts an assessment on the suitability 
of listing based on several criteria such as management team, conflict of interest between directors, 
underwriters and shareholders, business risk and the overall contribution to national economic growth. 
At the same time the company should submit a certified copy of its Memorandum and Articles of 
Association for approval by the KLSE. In addition, the company is also required to file with the 
KLSE its Initial Listing Application together with supporting documents in accordance with the 
Listing Requirements. After the application for listing has been approved by both the SC and the 
KLSE, the final copy of the prospectus has to be filed with the relevant authorities such as the 
Registrar of Companies and the KLSE. The company then advertises the prospectus to invite public 
investors to apply for new shares, usually a few months before listing. The offer period is considered 
open and required to be kept opened under the terms of the prospectus once the company advertises 
and issues the prospectus to the public. If the investors decide to apply for the new shares, they will 
then submit their applications with full payment. 
Next, the company will announce the basis for allotment, and balloting is conducted on the premises 
of the issuing house in the event of an over subscription at the close of the offer period. Currently 
there are only two recognized issuing houses in Malaysia which are the MIDF Consultancy & 
Corporate Services Sdn Bhd and the Malaysia Issuing House Bhd. Large over subscriptions are 
common in Malaysia, thus balloting takes place on the basis that is agreed upon by the underwriter, 
the issuer and the SC. Under the Malaysian law, at least 30 percent of the total issuing shares must be 
allocated for Bumiputra investors and therefore the first ballot is conducted on the basis of this 
regulation. Any unsuccessful Bumiputra applications are then included in the secohd balloting for the 
remaining 70 percent of shares, which are balloted among all Malaysian citizens including 
Bumiputras. Shares to these successful applicants are allotted on or before the listing day, while the 
refund checks are sent to the unsuccessful and partially successful applicants usually one week before 
the listing. Once the Central Depository confirmed that the securities accounts of all successful 
applicants have been duly credited, these shares are then admitted to the Official List of the KLSE and 
are traded on the KLSE three clear market days after that. 
V. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous Studies on Signalling Mechanisms in IPO Market 
The quality of financial advisers such as the auditors and the investment bankers signals useful 
information about the IPO (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Balvers, McDonald and Miller, 1988; Menon 
and Williams, 1991; Holland and Hurton, 1993; and Jang and Lin, 1993). Titman and Trueman (1986) 
argued that in a new issue setting, the true value of the firm's shares is imperfectly known by 
investors and that the quality of the auditor and investment banker chosen by the owner of the firm 
provides information to the market about the value. They developed a model applicable to both 
auditor and investment banker to demonstrate how the quality of financial advisers chosen can 
rationally be used by investors in valuing new issues. Based on the model, they were able to show that 
an entrepreneur with favourable information about the value of his firm chooses a higher-quality 
auditor and investment banker as opposed to an entrepreneur with less favourable information. They 
concluded that firm value is an increasing function of auditor and investment banker quality. 
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Balvers et al. (1989) performed a study on the interaction b e t ~ ~ e e n  the investment banker and the 
selection of an auditor in relation to the underpricing phenomenon. They contended that underpricing 
(the difference between the offer price of the IPO and the first day closing market price) is a function 
of 0 onre uncertainty about the value of the issue. The findings of the study provided evidence that -' 
engaging a reputable auditor helps to reduce this uncertainty in which firms with more reputable '2 
auditors have lower underpricing, although the magnitude of the effect of the auditor's reputation tend 
to decrease as the investment banker's reputation increases. 
The audited repon on the firm's current financial status is an important element in the prospectus, 
This basically means that the reputation of the auditor is likely to affect the perceived credibility of 
financial statements when a firm makes its IPO of securities. IPOs provide a market setting which has 
proved conducive to building and testing models of quality differentiated audits and auditor selection 
(Firth and Liau-Tan, 1998). Firms making lPOs typically are little known to investors who, in the 
absence of alternative sources of information, must place substantial reliance on the reports provided 
by the management. If the investors tend to differentiate between the levels of auditor quality, this 
should be more readily detected in the IPO market than in markets for older, better-known companies. 
Furthermore, Jang and Lin (1993) argued that for a typical informational event, it is usually difficult 
to isolate the effect of the event due to the continuing existence of a market surrounding the event. 
Thus, it is often difficult to anticipate when the information is actually incorporated into security 
prices, which is not a serious problem in IPO setting. Consider this as an advantage, researchers have 
developed analytical models to better explain the demand for audit quality in the IPO market. 
However, empirical studies have produced inconclusive findings as there is no clear evidence to 
support the propositions of these models (Firth and Liau-Tan, 1998). 
Audit Quality Research in Malaysia 
Simon et al. (1992) conducted a comparative study of the market fbr audit services in Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Malaysia and found that there is a strong demand for quality-differentiated audits in 
Hong Kong and Singapore, but not in Malaysia. They suggested that different national regulatory 
environment existed in Malaysia and this limited the involvement of international investors, thus 
reducing the need to have financial statements audited by firms with an international reputation. In 
addition they also argued that since many of the listed companies in Malaysia are family-owned, the 
majority shareholders have other sources of information on the holdings and performance of the firms, 
which basically led to reduced demand for quality-differentiated audit services. 
Eichenseher (1995) examined audit fee determinants in Malaysia and found that the Big Six audit 
firms have greater degree of involvement with foreign-owned firms than other audit firms. A study by 
Rose (1999) on audit fee determinants in Hong Kong and Malaysia also revealed the existence of dual 
markets for audit services for domestic audit clients and multinational clients in Malaysia. In 
particular, the study found that high levels of audit quality only existed within the multinational 
corporations but not within the domestic market segment. The researcher concluded that the results 
may be attributable to the fact that business environment in a developing country such as Malaysia is 
quite different from the one in developed countries. 
A more comprehensive study by Ayoib and Houghton (2001) focused on the effect of ethnicity of 
ownership andlor control of auditees and of auditors on the price paid by companies for audit services 
within Malaysia. They found evidence of significant association between ethnicity and audit fees. 
Specifically, the findings showed that Chinese controlled companies pay the lowest audit fees 
followed by Bumiputra and foreign controlled andlor companies. Interestingly, they also found the 
variables that proxied for audit quality, namely brand name auditor (Big Six firms) and auditor 
industry specialist, to be consistently significant in all of the regression results. The results provided 
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1 convincing support for the existence of product differentiation in the market for audit services in 
Malaysia. They attributed this to the utilisation of panel (multiple year) data and a more refined 
' model than those of previous studies. 
VI. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Datar et al. (1991) extended the signalling model that was first developed by Leland and Pyle (1977) 
to examine the value of different levels of audit (auditor) quality to entrepreneurs in issuing securities 
in a new issue setting. They argued that a risk-averse entrepreneur with private information about the 
expected future value of his firm seeks to raise capital from and share risks with investors in a 
competitive capital market. Investors, on the other hand, realize that the entrepreneur has private 
information about the hture value of his firm and these investors will undervalue the firm unless the 
entrepreneur convincingly communicates his information to them. The communication can be in 
various forms such as audit quality choice of the entrepreneur, the resulting audited report or as 
suggested by Leland and Pyle (1 977), the level ofretained ownership. 
More specifically, Datar et al. (1991) considered the simultaneous use of audited reports and 
percentage of retained ownership by using the latter to resolve any investor uncertainty not resolved 
by the former. The audited report refers to the information regarding the firm's current financial status 
contained in its prospectus. In their model, Datar et al. (1991) assumed that the audited reports serve 
to partially resolve any information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors. They developed 
testable propositions with regard to the impact of audited reports on the valuation of IPOs, in which 
they argued that during IPOs, the entrepreneur is motivated to communicate his private information to 
investors in order to avoid the undervaluation of shares. Nonetheless, he would prefer that investors 
do not receive additional information about the fum's payoff before they purchase claims to that 
payoff This is because in this particular situation, any additional firm-specific information will cause 
the market value of the claims to vary, which in turn will inflict uninsurable risk on the entrepreneur. 
This implies that the greater the riskiness of the payoff, the more costly it is for the entrepreneur to 
use the percentage of retained ownership as a signal, therefore higher-quality auditors can be used as a 
substitute to provide better reports that will enable the entrepreneur to reduce the required percentage 
of retained ownership. 
Based on this, Datar et a). (1991) demonstrated a value to audited reports that discriminate between 
entrepreneurs of a given type and lesser types who would not be able to provide a similarly favowable 
report. They also showed that the incremental value of audited reports is increasing in the risk of 
future cash flows of the fum. In other words, as the risks of a firm issuing shares to the public 
increases, an entrepreneur seeking to signal his private information about future cash flows will have 
greater incentive to increase the quality of auditing purchased, so that he can reduce his percentage of 
ownership retained in the finn. This is mainly due to the fact that as firm-specific risk increases, the 
i cost of retained ownership to an undiversified risk-averse entrepreneur also increases. The theory also 
implies a secondary prediction, which is ceteris paribus, the level of ownership retained by the 
entrepreneurs in higher-risk fums, which choose high quality auditors will be lower than the level of 
retained ownership in lower-risk firms that choose low quality auditors. This discussion leads to the 
first hypothesis, which is expressed in alternative form: 
HI:  IPOfirrns with greaterfirm-specific risk have a greater incentive to choose an auditor that is 
perceived by investors as high quality 
Datar et al. (1991) also assumed that high quality auditors are more discriminating in their assessment 
of the audited reports and also are more capable of handling any pressure from the entrepreneurs. 
Therefore audit quality plays an important role for the investors to interpret the reports provided by 
the entrepreneurs upon which these investors base their "pessimistic" beliefs about the entreprene 
expectations on the value of the IPO. This forms the basis for the second hypothesis that is expre 
in alternative form: 
H2: The information contained in a prospectus will result in higher stock market ~ a l u a t i o n f ~ ~  ' - 
fims audited by a high quality auditor than forjirms audited by a low quality auditor 
However, most of the studies performed in the U.S. provide no support for this demand side 
prediction (Simunic and Stein, 1987; Beany, 1989; and Feltham et a]., 1991). Using a count of risk 
factors listed in the prospectuses of sample firms as a proxy for the ex ante perceived riskiness ofthe 
firms, Simunic and Stein (1987) found a negative association between the ex ante risk measure and 
auditor quality. Beatty (1989) obtained similar findings using expost returns (as proxied by variability 
in stock market returns for the first 20 trading days). Then, a study was conducted by Feltham et al. 
(1991) using the data from Simunic and Stein's (1987) sample of 469 IPOs offered in 1981. Likewise, 
they also concluded that there is no association between firm-specific risk and auditor quality, and 
that higher quality audit provides no marginal effect on current market value of the firms. 
Feltham et al. (1991) conjectured that the lack of empirical support for hypothesized model was due to 1 
the impact of firm-specific risk differences on the supply side of the market for audits. They stated 
that while the theoretical model is concerned mainly with demand for high quality audit, the supply 
side factors such as auditors' willingness to accept certain IPO audit engagements are ignored. The 
supply side effect neutralizes and perhaps overwhelms the demand side effect as greater risk of firm 
cash flows is expected to increase an auditor's risk of litigation and hence supply price. This is in 
contrast to Datar et al:s (1991) prediction that the incremental benefit of a high quality auditor is an 
increasing hnction of the firm-specific risk. 
A subsequent study by Clarkson and Simunic (1994) using Canadian IPO data from the period of 
1984-1987 provided an empirical support to this conjecture. They believed that the supply-side effect 
that confounds the demand-side effect is likely to be weaker in Canada due to the different legal 
environment. Auditor litigation risk in Canada is lower than those of the U.S., thus neutralizing the 
supply-side effect of risk on auditor choice. The findings of their study indicated a positive relation 
between audit quality and risk and a significant difference in the audit quality-risk relationship 
between Canada and the U.S. Ln addition they also found that relative average retained ownership 
levels are consistent with the secondary prediction of Datar et al. (1991) in Canada, but not in the U.S. 
and that the difference is statistically significant. 
A more recent study is performed by Firth and Liau-Tan (1998) using the data on Singaporean IPO in ;j 
1980 to 1994. Similarly, they argued that the relatively low level of auditor litigation in Singaporean , , 
audit market provides a suitable setting to test Dam et al.'s (1991) model but in contrast to Feltham et i 
al. (1991) and Clarkson and Sirnunic (1994), they did not control for firm size to curtail the supply ;1 
side effect. Nevertheless, the results of the study provided evidence to the demand side prediction of , 
Datar et al. (1 99 l), indicating the importance of legal environment in influencing the demand for audit 
quality. However, they found no support that the financial reports attested to by higher quality :I 
auditors have a greater marginal effect on current market value than the audited reports associated -3 
with low quality auditors. 
Similar to Singapore, auditor litigation risk is very low in Malaysia hence provides a suitable i 
environment to test the demand-side prediction of Datar et al. (1991) since the supply-side problems 
identified by Feltham et al. (1991) will be less of a confounding factor. This is mainly because the .: 
relatively low level of litigation against the auditors provides more incentives for them to supply audit 4 service for the IPOs. Furthermore, the dearth of reported cases in Malaysia on the statutory civil 
844 :3 
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f, . liability for prospectuses can be explained by the causation element, which is regarded as the main 
. obstacle for recovery under section 46 of the Companies Act 1965 (Low, 1997). Section 46 of the Act 
provides the investor with an alternative right to compensation by imposing responsibility on persons 
who prepare or authorize the preparation of a prospectus (Legal Research Body, 1995). However, in 
order to succeed under this section, the plaintiff is required to establish that the securities had been 
subscribed for on the faith of a prospectus, and that the loss arose by reasons of untrue statements or 
omissions. 
Section 46(1) outlines the persons to be prima facie civilly liable for untrue statements, or willhl non- i disclosures in a prospectus. It states that any persons who acted merely in a professional or advisory 
/ capacity are to be excluded from the class of possible defendants, and that includes the auditors. 
Similarly, an expert named in the prospectus will not be liable for having authorized, or caused, its 
I issue for the purposes of section 46(1) unless he or she made untrue statements or non-disclosure in 
i 
, his or her capacity as an expert under the provision of section 46(2). In addition, even if the decisions 
were in favour of the plaintiffs, the damages awarded by the judges are likely to be less than the 
damages awarded in the U.S., especially since the decisions in the U.S. civil cases are made by juries 
that are perceived to award higher damages (Clarkson and Simunic, 1994). The measure of damages 
according to the Companies Act is the difference between the price paid for the securities and its real 
value at the time of the allotment or purchase, with the onus for proving that the securities acquired 
C 
were worth less than the purchase price lies with the plaintiff. The plaintiff is also not entitled to 
damages for loss of anticipated gains or for further losses sustained as a result of holding on to the 
securities. Therefore, given the small amount of recovery for damages, the plaintiffs usually have less 
incentive to file for lawsuits against the auditors. 
VII. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Model Specifications 
I .  The Auditor Choice Model 
Following previous studies, a multivariable logistic regression model of auditor choice based upon 
those used by Simunic and Stein (1987) and Clarkson and Simunic (1994) is developed to test the 
demand for auditors in a new issue setting. It is extended by incorporating two corporate governance 
variables; (NED) and (DUAL) which are likely to have an effect on auditor selection. The model is in 
the following form: 
AUD = Po + PIAGE + PIRISKFACT + P3SRISK + P,RETAIN + PjBOARD + 
P6UDW+ PILEV + PsNED + P9DUAL + E ----------- (1 
The variables are defined as follows: 
AUD = A (0,l) dummy variable with a value 1 indicating the auditor is 
li in the high quality' group 
AGE = Number of years the company has been in existence 
%A v~ 
RISKFACT =Number of risk factors from the prospectus 11 b' 1" 
SRISK = Residual return variance from the market model using 60 daily 
returns after the IPO listing 
RETAIN =Number of shares held by all pre-IPO shareholders after the new 
issue divided by the number of shares in issue after the IPO 
BOARD = A (0,l) dummy variable with a value I indicating the firm is on the Main Board of the 
KLSE 
UDW = A (0,l) dummy variable with a value 1 indicating a high prestige underwriter is 
appointed 
LEV = (Total debt less deferred tax) over book value of assets 
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NED =The percentage of non-executive directors on the board f 
DUAL = A (0,l) dummy variable with a value 1 indicating the existence of CEO duality iae. i;j 
position of the CEO and the Chairman is held by the same person < I  
E = Error term .! 
1 
Model I is utilized to test HI in which three hypothesis variables are incorporated in the mode] whicc 
are the proxies for firm-specific risk; AGE, RISKFACT and SRISK. In addition to these hypothesis d 
variables, other coneol variables that are likely to affect auditor selection are also included in 
model. 
2. Dependent Variable 
DeAngelo (1981) stated that large audit firms have less incentive to behave opp~rtunistical]~, and 
positively associated with high audit quality. This implies that auditor size is an appropriate meas 
of perceived audit quality. Similar to previous studies (Feltham et al., 1991; and Clark 
Simunic, 1994), the Big Five classification of auditor is used to proxy high quality auditors. 
of the Big Five categorization to differentiate size and quality attributes of auditors is due to 
international nature that allows them access to knowledge, expertise and experience. This i s  
conrrast to smaller firms that do not have the same resources to develop high quality expertise. = 
3. Hypothesis Variables 
Model 1 shows that three variables are used to measure the firm-specific risk of futur 
The fmt  two ex ante risk proxies, used by Feltham et al. (1991) are the number of years 
has been in existence (AGE) and the number of risk factors in the prospectus (RISKFA 
expected to be negatively associated with audit quality whereas a positive association is expected 
RISKFACT, which is consistent with Feltham et al. (1991) who suggested that riskier firms 
characterized by a smaller number of years since incorporation or a greater number of risk 1 
The other proxy, an ex post measure is the residual return variance from the market model mcru 
over the 60 trading days subsequent to listing of an issue on the KLSE (SFUSK). The method 1 
derive this particular er post measure is also employed by Feltham et al. (1991),  larkso on: 
Simunic (1994) and Firth and Liau-Tan (1998). Consistent with previous studies, a p 
association is expected for this risk variable. The erpost measure of risk is calculated as: 
Rjlt aj + PJ&r ' EJ, 
where 
Rj, = return on the finn for the ?' period 
R,, = return on the KLSE Composite Index (KLCI) for the Eh period 
E,, = residual retum on the jth firm for the P period 
a, = intercept for thel& firm * pj =slope (or 'beta') for the,& firm 4 
VI.1. I V. Control Variables 
Consistent with Datar et al .3 (1991) theory, which allows the entrepreneur to trade off 
retained ownership with the choice of higher quality auditor as a signal of 1PO firm value* a I 
relationship is hypothesized between the level of retained ownenhip (RETAIN) and audit quali 
' f f  
There are two types of board membership on the KLSE, namely the Main ~ o a r d  ad 
Board. Finns listed on the Main Board are usually larger in terms of size compared to thoSc1 
the Second Board. Due to the reputation of companies listed on the Main Board, they I" 
have greater incentive to hire auditor with higher reputation compared to companies On 
Board. Thus a positive association between BOARD and auditor selection is expected* 
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Previous studies have provided empirical supports that high reputation underwriters place greater 
reliance on high quality auditors to verify financial information during an IPO of a firm in order to 
preserve their own reputation (Balvers et al., 1988; and Menon and Williams, 1991). This suggests 
that underwriter (UDW) and auditor selection should be positively related. Following Firth and Liau- 
1 Tan (1998), underwriter is classified as high quality or low quality underwriters based on the 
p frequency of participating as managing underwriters. Thus, the following underwriters are coded as 1 ' i.e. the high quality underwriters: Commerce International Merchant Bankers Bhd, Arab-Malaysian 
Merchant Bank Bhd and Aseambankers Malaysia Bhd. These institutions are also the largest 
underwriters based on total issue proceeds, which is another classification used by Firth and Liau-Tan 
(1998) for prestigious underwriter. Apart from that, these underwriters are also considered among the 
strongest merchant banks in the country (Montagu-Pollock, 1999). 
The contracting theory proposes that firms with high level of leverage are more likely to choose a 
high quality auditor in order to monitor adherence to the restrictive covenants typically contained in 
debt agreements (Clarkson and Simunic, 1994). In addition, leverage may also be an additional proxy 
for cash flow risk in which highly levered firms have more variable cash flows hence entrepreneurs of 
the firms have greater incentive to use a high quality auditor to avoid undervaluation of shares. This 
implies that the coefficient for leverage (LEV) is expected to be positive. 
O'Sullivan (2000) proposed that a high proportion of non-executive directors on a board is likely to 
r influence the quality of audit process. The findings of the study provided evidence consistent with the 
prediction, in which board's independence as measured by the percentage of non-executive directors 
on the board is found to be associated with higher audit quality. Beasley (1996) tested the prediction 
that the inclusion of larger proportion of outside members on the board of directors significantly 
reduces the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Results from the analysis provided strong support 
to the prediction since no-fraud f i s  were found to have boards with significantly higher percentages 
of outside directors than fi-aud fums. This reflects the strong involvement of independent outside 
directors in auditor selection process in which it can be argued that a board controlled by outside 
directors would prefer a high quality auditor. Based on these arguments, the coefficient for NED is 
expected to be positive. 
In addition to NED, another variable for corporate governance, which is CEO duality (DUAL), is also 
tested for its association with auditor selection. CEO duality is a situation whereby the position of a 
Chairman of a board in a particular company is also held by its CEO. Donaldson and Davis (1994) 
examined the effects of CEO duality on shareholder returns and found that shareholder returns, in 
fenns of ROE are superior when there is CEO duality thus suggesting that there may be a long-term 
Positiw impact of CEO duality on shareholder wealth. Similar to previous variable, this finding may 
indicak that a f i  with CEO duality (DUAL) is more likely to choose high quality auditors in order 
a to P m  the wealth of its shareholders since the interest of the CEO now is also aligned with those of 
the shnreholders, thus DUAL is expected to be positively related to audit quality. 
C 
i'aluation Model 
problems associated with the logistic regression model, and it provides an alternative measure off,,,,,. 
specific risk" (Clarkson and Sirnunic, 1994, p. 2 16). 
The valuation model is in the following form: 




V = Value of the firm, as measured by the offer price times the total shares 
outstanding after the new issue 
ALPHA = - [In (1 - RETAIN) + RETAIN] where RETAIN is the fraction of shares . 
retained by all pre-IPO shareholders 
NASSETS = Book value of the firm's net assets after the new issue 
I' = Error term 
Based on Datar et al.'s (1991) theory, the coefficients of the intercept (i.e. DO) should be negative in 
order to reflect the adjustment for systematic risk. On the other hand, the coefficient of both P,  and p, 
on ALPHA and NASSETS are expected to be positive. The first independent variable and its 
coefficient (PI) reflects the entrepreneur's aversion to risk (b) and the firm-specific risk that he faces 
(RISK), thus 
where r = risk free interest rate 
The coefficient provides the basis for the regression tests of HI, which suggests that P I  for high 
quality auditor subsample will be greater than PI for the low quality auditor subsample and also to test 
the secondary prediction of Datar et al. (1991). Higher coefficient for high quality auditors indicates 
higher market valuation for a given level of entrepreneur ownership i.e. by using high quality auditor 
entrepreneur can reduce percentage of retained ownership and maintain market value at the same 
time. 
The second independent variable NASSETS, and its coefficient represent the information contained in 
the prospectus upon which the investors base their "pessimistic" beliefs about the entrepreneur's 
expectations. The coefficient P2 is used to test H.2 in which it is expected that, due to greater investors' 
confidence in reports approved by high quality auditors, p2 will be larger for the high quality auditor 
subsample than for the low quality auditor subsample. This particular hypothesis receives no 
empirical support from previous studies since the coefficient difference for the two subsamples are 
not statistically significant (Feltham et al., 1991 and Firth and Liau-Tan, 1998). 
Another valuation model is also developed using the profit forecast contained in the prospectus of 
IPOs. The market perceives earnings forecast as a credible signal of value and therefore forecast 
inclusion or exclusion in IPO prospectuses is potentially informative to the capital markets. This 
indicates that profit forecasts are better predictors of actual earnings than are historical profit numbers 
or simple time series projections of historical profits (Firth, Kwok, Liau-Tan and Yeo, 1995). 
Furthermore, these data are readily available since both the KLSE Listing Requirements request for 
the preparation of a profit forecast together with the underlying assumptions as to its computation. 
The model is in the following form: 
V = PO + P IALPHA + P2PROFOR+ p 
where 
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V = Value of the firm, as measured by the offer price times the total shares 
outstanding after the new issue 
ALPHA = - [In (I - RETAM) + RETAIN] where RETAIN is the Eraction of shares 
retained by all pre-IPO shareholders 
PROFOR = Profit forecast contained in the prOSpeChlS 
I' = Error term 
Sample and Data 
The data used in this study consist of all IPOs on the KLSE from both the Main Board and the Second 
Board for a four-year period from 1998 to 2001. This period is chosen in order to utilize the most 
recent data. Firstly, a list of IPO firms for the four-year period is extracted from Investors Digest and 
is compared against the list obtained fiom the KLSE website. A total of 107 IPO firms were 
identified. Individual firm in the sample is crosschecked against the list of firms listed on the KLSE, 
which can be obtained from the KLSE website in order to examine whether it is still active and 
whether there have been any changes of name. 
Information on the IPOs for the year 2000 and 2001 is extracted from the new issue prospectuses that 
can be obtained from the KLSE website. However, since the new issue prospectuses for 1998 and 
some for 1999 were not readily available fiom the website, some of the data are drawn from the 
prospectuses that are available in the KLSE Library. Three IPO firms were excluded from the sample 
due to unavailability of prospectuses. Therefore, a total of 104 IPO firms form the final sample. 
Meanwhile, the data for Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) from 1 January 1998 to 30 April 
2002 and share prices for individual firms were obtained from the Bloomberg database available in 
the KLSE Library. 
VIII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Analysis 
Summary statistics of the sample partitioned on the basis of the Big Five-non-Big Five auditor 
classification are reported in Table 1. Seventy-two IPOs have Big Five auditors while thirty-hvo have 
non-Big Five firms. The t values for differences in the means between high quality and low quality 
auditors are also shown in the table. From the table, it is apparent that there is no support for the 
model proposed by Datar et al. (199 1). 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for a Sample of 104 IPO Firms Partitioned by Auditor Quality 
Auditor Oualitv 
i Variable High Low I-value 




RETAIN 0.773 0.796 - 1 .OOO 




Means are shown first followed by standard deviations (in parentheses) 
None of the three risk proxies differ significantly between the two groups. However, the ex ante risk 
proxy RlSKFACT is in the direction predicted by Datar et al. (1991). The results also show that the 
coefficients of the other two risk proxies, AGE and SRlSK are in the opposite direction of the 
prediction. This in a way indicates that IPO firms choosing a Big Five auditor is less rather than more 
risky than those selecting a non-Big Five auditor. 
The coefficient for RETAIN however does suggest that the Big Five auditors are associated with 
lower retained ownership by the entrepreneurs although the strength of this relationship is not 
statistically significant. This is also m e  for the remaining two variables, LEV and NED in which the 
differences in leverage and the proportion of non-executive directors across the two auditor groups are 
not statistically significant despite the fact that the coefficients are consistent with the hypothesized 
direction. 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables 






NED 1.00 -.269** 
DUAL 1 .OO 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the independent variables. The result indicates that 
the correlations between the risk proxies and the other variables are relatively low. Other independent 
variables also have low levels of correlation. Since all correlations exhibit values below 0.4, thus 
multicollinearity is not likely to be a problem in this study 
Regression Analysis 
I. The Auditor Choice Model 
Results for the logistic regression for this model are presented in Table 3. Note that the signs of the 
coefficients of the variables are generally in agreement with the expectations of Datar et al. (1991) 
although most are not statistically significant and the overall fit for the mod$ is quite low (R' = 
0.106). However, this figure is comparable with previous studies in which the R-= 0.1 12 and 0.156 in 
Firth and Liau-Tan (1998) and Clarkson and Simunic (1994) respectively. The table shows that only 
one explanatory variable (BOARD) is positive and significant at the 1% level as predicted. This 
basically suggests that there is greater demand for high audit quality from IPO firms on the Main 
Board as compared with those on the Second Board. Other control variables UDW, LEV, NED and 
DUAL have the expected signs although they lack the statistical significance. 
Most importantly, the results reveal that expected directions of the coefficients across the three firm- 
specific risk proxies are of mixed signs, which provides mixed directional support for HI. The 
coefficients for both ex ante risk proxies AGE and RISKFACT are in the expected direction, but they 
are not significant. However, similar to the univariate test, the ex post risk proxy (SRISK) has a 
coefficient value that is inconsistent with the prediction of Datar et al. (1991). The lack of statistical 
significance for all risk proxies provides no support for HI. Apart from that, the results also show that 
RETAIN is negative as predicted although the coefficient is not significant. This indicates that there is 
also no evidence to support the secondary prediction of Datar et al. (1991) in which there will be a 
degree of substitution between retained ownership and the level of audit quality selected. 
Table 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of Auditor Choice 
AUD = P O  + P 1 AGE + P2 RISKFACT + P3 SRISK + P4 RETAIN + 
P5BOARD + P6UDW+ P7LEV + P8NED + P9DUAL + E 













Nagelkerke R'= 0.106 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
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2. The Valuation Model 
In order to substantiate these results and determine whether they are dependent on the specific teaing 
method (which in this case the logistic regression), well to test for H2, the valuation modc] 
proposed by Feltham et al. (1991) is used. Results for the valuation models are shown in Table 4. 
L 
@ >kb p b l e  4: Regression Results of the Valuation Model 
$ .Pane! A:  V =PO + PI ALPHA + P2NASSETS + p 
\ ? )  
Auditor Quality 
Variable High (n- 72) Low (n-32) Difference 
Intercept P O  3'1.768 3 1 . Y M  
(- 1.207) (2.836)*** 
Panel B: V =DO + PI ALPHA + PZPROFOR + p 
Intercept DO -265.862 95.648 
$ 
3 ALPHA P 1 74.070 -9.1 17 83.190 
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
**Significant at the 0.05 level 
***Significant at the 0.01 level 
As discussed earlier, hypothesized relationships include positive coefficients on P I  and P2, a negative 
coefficient on PO, and the PI and P2 coefficients for the Big Five are to exceed the non-Big Five PI  and 
P2 coefficients. Ramanathan (1995) stated that when heteroscedasticity is present but ignored, this 
invalidates tests of hypothesis because the OLS estimates of ps are biased and inconsistent. Therefore, 
v the results in both tables take into account the presence of heteroscedasticity and corrected using 
Cook-Weisberg test of heteroscedasticity. 
Panel A of Table 4 reports a good statistical fit for both auditor quality partitions (R2 = 0.996 and 
0.880) while a moderate to low statistical fit is presented in Panel B (R2 = 0.554 and 0.134) for high 
auditor quality and low auditor quality partition respectively. The results are consistent with previous 
studies in which high across both auditor groups is reported in most of the regressions of the 
valuation model. For example in Feltham et al. (1991) the R2 ranges from 0.806 to 0.619 while in 
Firth and Liau-Tan (1998) the R2 is from 0.91 to 0.44. Feltham et al. (1991) argued that R2 is large in 
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most of the regressions because both the dependent variable (total market value) and the audited 
report (total book value) are subject to a common size effect. 
From Panel A, it can be seen that although the coefficient of Po for high auditor quality partition is 
negative as expected, it is not significant. However, the low auditor quality partition has a positive and 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) coefficient, which is in contrast to the expected direction. 
Likewise, Panel B also shows that the coefficient of Po is positive and significant (at the 10% level) 
for low auditor quality partition. On the other hand, the coefficient of Po for the high auditor quality 
partition is negative as expected, however it lacks the statistical significance. 
The PI coefficient on ALPHA is always positive except for the low auditor quality partition in Panel 
B, but none is statistically significant. The results also reveal that the P, coefficient for the high 
auditor quality partition is higher than the corresponding PI coefficient for the low auditor quality 
partition in both Panel A and B, thus provide directional support for H 1. Unfortunately, the difference 
across the two auditor groups is not statistically significant therefore this model also provides results 
that are basically consistent with the results from logistic regression model in which no evidence is 
found to support HI. However, it should also be noted that the results are the same with those 
generated by Firth and Liau-Tan (1 998) using Singaporean data. 
The P2 coefficients of NASSETS and PROFOR are used to test H2. From Table 4, it can be seen that 
P2 are always positive as expected with varying degrees of significance. Specitically, the coefficients 
of NASSETS are found to be highly significant at the 1% level for both auditor quality groups while 
the coefficients of PROFOR has a 5% and 10% level of significance for high auditor quality partition 
and low auditor quality partition respectively. Furthermore, the comparison of regression coefficients 
across the two auditor quality groups also shows that p2 for high auditor quality partition is greater 
than those of the low auditor quality partition and that the difference is highly significant at the 1% 
level for NASSETS and 5% level for PROFOR. This result provides support for H2, which 
hypothesizes that P2 is larger for the high quality subsample thus reflecting greater degree of 
confidence placed by investors in the reports provided by high quality auditors. 
Further Analysis 
Further analyses are conducted using alternative measurements for both the auditor choice model and 
the valuation model and the results do not differ significantly fiom previous tests. The result. are also 
not sensitive to further tests that take into account the omission of variables, the presence of outliers 
and also the size effect. 
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The objective of this paper is to empirically investigate the demand-side prediction of Datar et al. 
tiw (1991) and the supply-side prediction of Feltham et al. (1991) on audit quality in an IPO setting, thus 
provide evidence in relation to its role as one of the signalling mechanisms. 
The results of this study provide no support for HI since no significant relationship is observed 
between firm-specitic risk and audit quality, which basically implies that firms facing greater firm- 
specific risk have no incentive to hire a high quality auditor. In addition, the results also suggest that 
Malaysian entrepreneurs do not employ audit quality as a substitute signal of their firm value to 
enable them to reduce the percentage of retained ownership during the IPOs. Many of the listed 
companies in Malaysia began as family owned companies and remain to be family controlled even 
after going public (Simon et al., 1992). This could be the reason why there is no trade off between 
audit quality and retained ownership. A high level of retained ownership can usually be observed in 
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family controlled firms, which may imply that retained ownership itself may not be regarded as an 
important signalling mechanism, thus undermines the use of audit quality as a substitute signal of firm 
value. In other words, there is also no support for Datar et al.'s (1991) secondary prediction in audit 
quality model, which allows the entrepreneur to trade off reduced retained ownership with the choice 
of a higher quality audit. 
Interestingly, in contrast to previous studies (Feltham et al., 1991 ; and Firth and Liau-Tan, 1998), the 
results yield support for H2, which indicates that information contained in the prospectus audited by 
high quality auditor (i.e. the Big Five audit firms) are perceived as more reliable by investors since it 
has a significant effect on the market valuation of IPO stocks. This is consistent with the prediction of 
Datar et al. (1991) that there is a positive relationship between audit quality and the market valuation 
of IPO. Unlike in the U.S., auditors in Malaysia do not only audit the historical information and 
reports on financial information in the prospectus but they are also required to report on the forecast 
of future earnings such as profit and dividend that appear in the prospectus (Low, 1997). Due to the 
extensive work done on the prospectus, they are likely to identify cases where the IPO firm is trying 
to provide the wrong signal to the market by hiring high quality auditor to protect their otherwise low 
quality and undervalued stocks. Therefore, the results demonstrate that markets (i.e. investors) do 
recognize audit quality and that audit quality is used alongside audited reports by the entrepreneurs to 
communicate their private information to prospective investors. Overall, the study provides evidence 
to the role of audit quality as a signalling mechanism in the valuation of an IPO, although it is not 
used by Malaysian entrepreneurs together with the level of retained ownership so as to allow them to 
reduce their percentage of retained ownership. 
The study not only shed insights into the behaviour of auditors, entrepreneurs and investors in an IPO 
environment, but also presents evidence on the influential role of legal environment as well as the 
unique social background of Malaysian companies in shaping the demand for and supply of audit 
quality. In addition, it also offers support to the existence of the demand for quality-differentiated 
audits in Malaysia. 
This study is not without limitation especially with regards to its sample size. Apparently, the sample 
size used in this study is fairly small compared to previous studies. Feltham et al. (1991) for example 
employed a sample of 469 new issues, while Firth and Liau-Tan (1 998) used 132 prospectuses in their 
study. However, the results could be generalized to the Malaysian market considering the number of 
newly listed companies every year in Malaysia. 
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